










Interest Groups and Government Spending 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2722 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Interest Groups and Government Spending 





In the last two decades of the XIX century Italy became an industrial country. Historians 
maintain that this process was affected by the action of some interest groups that pursued both 
state protection from competition and specific public expenditure programs. Starting from the 
economic literature of interest groups, this paper attempts to empirically investigate the role 
of the interest groups in public expenditure decisions in Italy from 1876 to 1913. We argue 
that a proper indicator of the role of interest groups is their output. The analysis suggests that 
government spending was sensitive to the preferences of heavy industry rather then those of 
textile and cereal cultivators. We therefore highlight the role of the political process in setting 
economic policy at the early stages of Italian development. 
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 1. Introduction  
In the last two decades of the XIX century, Italy experienced a change in its political 
system, and simultaneously became an industrial country. The law on tariff barriers to 
international trade passed on July 14, 1887 represents a key event of this process, by 
protecting grain, textile, sugar and steel industries. The Italian tariff was part of generalised 
protectionism in Europe, Austria-Hungary in 1882, Germany in 1879 and France in 1881 
followed similar policies. In the late XIX century only England, the Netherlands and Belgium 
carried on the free trade policy in Europe. The 1887 tariff originated from landed interests 
concerned about falling grain prices resulting from American and Russian competition in the 
context of rapidly declining transportation costs. As the landed interests did not carry 
sufficient lobbying power a quid pro quo was negotiated with both textile and heavy industry 
for mutual support in Parliament for the respective demand for protection.
1  
Economic historians for a long time have discussed the necessity of the protectionist 
trade policy choice in Europe and in Italy in the late XIX century. Most historians’ 
contributions agree that only a protectionist trade policy would have allowed a solid 
industrialisation to European late comers. With respect to the Italian case, Zamagni (1993) 
and Pescosolido (1998) followed this line of reasoning. Applying an infant industry argument, 
they maintained that without protection Italian industry would have not been able to survive 
foreign competition and Italy would not have developed. Federico and O’Rourke (1999) 
found that removal of trade barriers would have had small welfare and income distribution 
effects. 
Scholars also have emphasised that the protectionist choice in Italy was driven by the 
action of specific interest groups. Gerschenkron highlighted that public intervention and more 
generally the activist state policy was appropriate in the situation of the new Kingdom. 
                                                 
1 The law passed with 199 ‘yes’ and 27 ‘no’. Toniolo (1990) described the ‘horse trading’ that took place among 
parliamentarians interested in helping specific firms in their constituencies.  Nevertheless, he argued that this policy was devoted to economically unproductive projects, 
such as the promotion of the steel industry in Terni in 1884 and the subsidisation of the 
shipbuilding and naval industry between 1885 and 1896 (Gerschenkron, 1962). Fenoaltea 
(1978) condemned the choice of protecting the heavy industry because it strongly penalised 
the mechanical industry due to the higher costs of iron and steel. Federico and Tena (1998, 
1999) have computed effective protection rates showing that some groups were strongly 
protected and others were not, without any coherence across sectors. They conclude that the 
lobbying activity of some interest groups was more effective than the activity of other groups 
in capturing politicians.
2 The key element these analyses share is that some interest groups 
affected the mechanisms of capital formation, pursuing both protection from the competition 
and specific public spending programs (Bonelli, 1975, 1978; Capone, 1981).  
A formal analysis of this hypothesis has yet to be carried out. So far the studies that 
have been developed do not go beyond descriptive statistics to motivate their arguments and 
do not provide any formal test.
3 Data limitations partly explain the absence of more rigorous 
inquiries on this issue.  
This paper builds on this line of reasoning: according to the public choice theory of 
government, we empirically examine the role the groups protected by the 1887 trade law 
exerted upon the expenditure decision-making process. We do not attempt to explain the 
economic and political determinants of the trade policy or relate revenues raised by tariffs 
with government spending. Rather, we use the protectionist trade policy of 1887 to identify 
the groups that emerged as interest groups and investigate the impact (pressure) of those 
groups on the size and the scope of the public sector from 1876 to 1913.  W e  d o  s o  b y  
                                                 
2 Fenoaltea (2006) provides an opinionated review of the issue. 
3 Brosio and Marchese (1986; 1988) built a model of demand in which the expenditure level is chosen by a 
median voter that belongs to an élite. They tested such a model for the time span 1861-1914. Fratianni and 
Spinelli (1982) focus on the determinants of public sector growth from 1861 to 1979 using a model of 
specialised groups.  applying the interest group theory as a formal positive economic analysis of government 
behaviour as developed in the public choice literature. The starting point of the public choice 
view in analysing the role of the interest groups in policy formation is the fundamental 
importance of the rational maximising behaviour of private actors, and of politicians and 
bureaucrats as well. Individual incentives, the prospect of personal gain and loss motivate 
public sector actors, just as they do those in the private sector. Thus, governmental policies 
follow from the decision taken by self-interest individuals (politicians and bureaucrats) within 
the government organisation. The central aspect of public choice interest group theory 
concerns the nexus between politicians and voters (interest groups). Such a nexus can be 
stated more or less in conventional demand and supply terms (McCormick and Tollison, 
1981). On the one hand, interest groups maximise their utility functions by demanding certain 
policies (transfer, public goods, regulation). On the other hand, individual policy makers 
maximise the probability of winning elections and offer pieces of legislation. Thus, elected 
officials act as brokers among competing interest groups pairing demanders and suppliers of 
regulation, as well as legislatures are the place “to clear the market for wealth transfers” 
(Shughart and Tollison, 1986). An important insight of interest group models is that the 
effectiveness of group lobbying activities is inversely related to its size, due to the 
heterogeneity of its memberships and goals (Olson, 1965).  
As a positive theory of government, the interest group theory has been applied and 
explains a large variety of historical and contemporaneous governmental activities (Ekelund 
and Tollison, 1997), the government impact on income distribution (Congleton and Shugart, 
1990), economic growth (Olson, 1982), and the activity of an individual legislator (Bronars 
and Lott, 1994). Yet, the main focus of the literature of interest groups has been the growth of 
government (McCormick and Tollison, 1981; Olson, 1982; Mueller and Murrel, 1986; 
Shugart and Tollison, 1986). These models, by emphasising the voting process within the legislature and the competition among different interest groups, predict a potential positive 
impact of interest groups seeking wealth transfers through the political process on the level of 
government, however measured (e.g., spending, regulation and so on).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 frames the historical and 
political background. The model is specified in section 3 and tested in section 4. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Identifying interest groups: the historical background 
In order to place our analysis in a historic perspective, this section provides an 
illustration of some historical events that motivate the empirical relationship we identify and 
show the key role of the interest groups in shaping public policy.  
In 1861 the Kingdom of Piedmont became the Kingdom of Italy. After that, most of 
the effort was finalised to enforce a homogeneous set of rules throughout the national territory 
and to build an economy able to compete with the more advanced European countries. In 
1876 the Right (Destra Storica) was defeated and the Left (Sinistra Storica) came into power. 
These changes in government produced at last two distinctive processes. First, the state 
became a financial institution that, by means of public debt and receipts, redistributed some of 
the resources generated in agriculture to other sectors of the economy (Aquarone, 1981). 
Second, the political equilibrium based on the interests of landowners and traders came to an 
end. These processes were closely linked. On the one hand, the state had a prominent role in 
the accumulation of capital. The modernisation of the economy started during the last ruling 
years as the Right became effective. Inflows of foreign capital were favoured by the abolition 
of the inconvertibility of the currency and by monetary stabilisation. A large government 
expenditure program was set to give the opportunity of new industrial investments. In order to 
increase the stock of fixed social capital and to support the steel-mechanical industry, privileges to Italian firms for railway works were accorded through the so-called Baccarini 
Law in 1882 and, indirectly, through the nationalisation of the railways by the establishment 
of the company Ferrovie dello Stato (National Railways Company) in 1905. This company 
gave procurements to the national industry by updating the rolling-stock. Furthermore, 
between 1885 and 1896, a program of subsidisation of the shipbuilding and naval industry 
was promoted. Between 1885 and 1913 the national naval industry received an average of 22 
million liras per year (Zamagni, 1993). In 1884 a complete iron mill was created in Terni with 
public funds.  
Overall government spending experienced a rapid growth throughout our sample. 
Simultaneously, changes in the composition of government budget took place; in particular 
spending on public services, such as transport, communication and construction and, later, 
spending on provision of public goods, such as education, increased
  (Brosio and Marchese, 
1986; Aidt et al., 2006). On the other hand, this “new” role of the state, together with the 
agricultural crisis due to the competition from overseas and the failure of the capitalistic 
development in agriculture changed both the economic and the political weight of the primary 
sector. Starting from the 1880s until World War I, the political system was characterised by 
the alliance between new entrepreneurial groups, mostly related with the heavy industry, and 
the traditional landowners of the South (Candeloro, 1970; Capone, 1981).   
The effects on public policy of the consolidation of the alliance between traditional 
landowners and a more dynamic bourgeoisie appears more evident when we take into account 
two institutional issues that resulted in the electoral reform enacted in 1882. The reform 
extended the franchise for male voters, lowered the minimum voting age from 25 to 21 years 
and required as the essential condition capacity instead of socio-economic status. Meanwhile, 
status was considered an alternative to the accomplishment of the second year of primary 
school and was reduced from 40 to 19.80 liras. The gradual lifting of socio-economic restrictions on voting franchise strongly enlarged the constituency. In 1880 voters counted for 
2.2% of the population of the Kingdom, while in 1882 they increased to 6.9% (Caracciolo, 
1977). The reform law also modified the electoral regulations. Beginning from 1882 the 
district size was broadened and the single-member districts replaced with a system of 
competing lists to favour competition between political-ideological groups. 
The second important institutional factor derives from the social composition of the 
Left. The change in power from the Right to the Left was more sociological than ideological. 
In fact, the Left kept a substantial continuity with previous policies. However, the Left was 
not homogeneous in bringing together landowners, new financial aristocracy, speculators, 
urban professionals and new entrepreneurs (Farneti, 1971). The electoral reform of 1882 was 
the result of the heterogeneous political composition of the élites and, at the same time, 
emphasised such heterogeneity by modifying both the constituency size and electoral districts.  
 
3. The empirical model 
Starting from the literature on interest groups, this section empirically estimates the 
influence of the interest groups on public expenditure programs between 1876 and 1913. The 
dependent variable of the model is the deviation of real total government expenditure from its 
trend value (DEVEXP). Our choice to use a) an aggregate measure of public spending, rather 
than particular expenditure areas, and b) the deviation of this measure from its trend deserves 
some discussion. Many empirical studies are concerned with narrow policy areas as they 
evaluate the success or failure of an interest group in influencing policy in one particular area.  
However, also non-voting activities like making up the details of the laws, lobbying among 
representatives, formulating amendments and so on, are crucial in determining legislative 
outcomes. In addition, the effect of lobbying is incremental and not only redistributive with 
respect to government spending: once some specific spending program has been captured by an interest group it is easier - for politicians - to add another one in order to help another 
group instead of shifting resources from one group to the other. Some sectors directly benefit 
from government spending via procurements. Among those considered here, iron and steel are 
the most important, since governments buy military equipment. However, government 
spending may indirectly  benefit other sectors: agriculture from public investments in 
irrigation, for example; other areas of business from capital transfers to build new factories, 
and so on. Based on these arguments, we prefer to use an aggregate policy outcome like total 
government expenditure, rather than to analyse particular functions of public expenditure. 
There are a number of reasons to choose the deviation from the trend of real total 
government expenditure. First, the Italian budget referred to fiscal years and was approved 
(roughly) in the spring. Thus, for example, the figure for 1901 would represent the average of 
expenditures for 1900-01 (decided in Spring 1900) and 1901-02 (approved in Spring 1901). It 
is implausible that governments and industry lobbyists were influenced by a prediction of 
1901 output in making their decisions at budget time in Spring 1900 and Spring 1901.  The 
whole decision-making process was drawn out over many years.   Second, government 
spending is also determined by new “needs” (i.e., schooling), that are partially a function of 
time, therefore we want to remove them from the outcome of the lobbying activity. The 
variable is obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, with λ = 100 as suggested by 
Hodrick and Prescott for annual data.
4 
 The main problem of empirical analyses in the field of interest groups is related to the 
identification of a proxy for the special group. In order to capture the pressure of the interest 
                                                 
4 We interpret the Hodrick-Prescott Filter as a device to obtain an estimate of the trend without an economic 
meaning in this context. The Filter includes the value at t + 1 of the variable, and for the reasons outlined above 
this would imply a very forward-looking behaviour from interests groups and politicians. We have also 
estimated long-run government spending through a 3-year moving average, and results for deviation of 
government spending obtained in this way are similar to those presented here. They are available upon request 
from the authors.  groups in shaping public policy, some models focus on their political activities, such as the 
campaign contributions (Crain and Tollison, 1977) and the lobbying activity in the legislative 
and executive branches of government (McCornik and Tollison, 1981). As the data on interest 
groups activity are sometimes not available, some contributions use the structural 
characteristics of the groups. Gardner (1987) employs the average size of the producers and 
the percentage of owners’ income. Mueller and Murrell (1986) and McCallum and Blais 
(1987) estimate the strength of interest groups by the number of special interest organisations. 
To measure ideological groups and labour unions that are formally organised, Kischgassner 
and Pommerehne (1988) use the number or the percentage of members. When the interest 
group is not formally organised and membership data are unavailable, indirect ex ante 
proxies, such as the number of producers in an industry (Guttman, 1978; Miller, 1991) or 
some measures of concentration, are applied. Yet in this case, while the results in support of 
the influence of the interest groups in public policy formation are not robust; the relationship 
between numbers and influence might be non-monotonic and might be dependent on the type 
of interest group. 
We use the law enacted in 1887 as an instrument to detect the special interest groups 
that acted as “pressure groups” on the public decision-making process. By means of duties 
and tariffs such a law protected from international competition the entrepreneurs of textile, 
sugar, steel and grains. All of them are considered in our analysis as the interest groups that 
affected government expenditure programs. One may wonder that the political decisions 
which the 1887 law reflects were not the outcome of a coherent vision for supporting certain 
industries instead of others. Nevertheless, the relationship between public expenditure and the 
interest groups that benefited from the protectionist law seems historically correct and 
analytically sustainable. Some of the mechanisms implemented in 1887 (in particular, the 
willingness of the political system to compromise with interest groups) kept in place for a long time (Bonelli, 1978; Aquarone, 1981).   
Some models (e.g., Mueller and Murrel, 1986) measure interest groups using either the 
number of special interest organisations in a country or the number of the members of each 
group. This kind of proxies has the advantage of solving the free-riding problems that, as 
Olson’s (1965) influential theoretical study highlighted, may arise from the increase in the 
group size. Because of the lack of data, it is impossible to replicate this procedure. Even so, 
the use of the number of the workers is an unsatisfactory way to measure and compare the 
interest group influence in our sample because the groups we identify present quite a different 
capital/labour ratio. For this reason, we cannot exclude a priori that a sector may have 
relatively few members due to a more intensive use of capital, but which may exert a large 
impact on public decision-making process.  
On the one hand, one may argue that an index of concentration would be a more 
appropriate measure. The degree of concentration, as well as the membership, allows 
alleviating the collective action problems (free-riding). However, the relationship between the 
independent variable and the proxies like the membership or the degree of concentration is 
not only driven by free-riding effects but also by effects which relate to the “political 
strength” of an interest group. In our sample textile and grain productions are fragmented in a 
wide number of medium and small sized enterprises; further, in all of the industries we have 
analysed importers co-exist with exporters, then different goals subsist within the same 
industry. Nevertheless, we do not know the internal organisation of the group, for instance, 
whether the interests of some members enterprises of an industry are pivotal with respect to 
the interests of some other members of the same group, or if a larger group (with a larger free-
riding problem) has more electoral resources. In other words, the relationship between 
number and influence is not a linear one, and perhaps not even a monotonic one. Based on the 
Olson argument and considering the internal organisation of the industries we have analysed, an index of concentration might underestimate or overestimate the strength of the interest 
group as a pressure group.  
These considerations, together with the unavailability of suitable alternative data, have 
driven us to measure the identified groups through the gross saleable output of cereals (CER) 
and the value added of the textile (TEX) and the iron and steel industries (ISI).
5 As 
disaggregated data do not exist for the sugar industry, we are not able to construct the related 
interest group proxy.
6  
The measures we propose make it possible to compare the strength of the different 
entrepreneurs in shaping government expenditure. Furthermore, as we emphasise the 
importance of the special interest groups in adding further expenditure items to the public 
budget, our proxies give a good approximation of the income that these industries produced 
and then of the wealth transfers that policy makers caused through redistribution and public 
expenditure
7. The basic hypothesis is that the size of government is positively related to the 
strength of the interest groups; thus, CER, TEX and ISI are expected to be positive.
8  
The traditional role of the government views it as a provider of public goods. We 
                                                 
5 Putting iron and steel industries together with engineering is maybe questionable since, according to 
Gershenkron (1962), the latter was penalised by the protection of the former. However, Toniolo (1977, 1990) 
claims that this is not the case.  
6 The use of sugar sale tax revenue to measure the product of the sugar industry (or for all industries) is 
impossible given the large number of missing data in Istat (1958).   
7 Kamath (1989) also uses income variables to capture the “political success” of the interest groups in shaping 
public policy.  
8 A possible alternative to value added are tariff rates, but they are extremely difficult to calculate. First, they 
differed among each group (for example, for cottons we need to distinguish between several subgroups: raw 
cotton includes carded cotton, cotton wool, and cotton waste; among cloth we distinguish between standard grey, 
bleached, dyed and printed cloth; other cotton products  include other cotton products (embroidered and 
brocaded cloth, muslin, tulle, velvet, knits, ribbons, trimmings. A third group covers mixed textiles (Fenoaltea, 
2001; 2003). Second, they were frequently revised. Third, importers were often able to bypass statutory rates. 
Another unsuitable alternative is the revenue from imported goods: a very successful tariff would make imports 
equal to zero, therefore providing no revenue.  consider this issue by including the variable POP, which is the size of the total population 
(Istat, 1957). We expect POP to be positive, since demand for public goods grows as long as 
population increases. Finally, we take into consideration changes in the institutional, political 
and legislative environment that occurred along the transition from a restrictive  electoral 
system to its extension in 1882. The number of people with the right to vote is given by the 
variable VOT (Istat, 1958).  Basic economic principles suggest that the extension of franchise 
should be associated with some expansion of the public sector, in particular in cases where 
democratically elected governments become accountable to poorer voters (Meltzer and 
Richard, 1981). On the basis of these arguments we expect VOT to be positive. Finally, we 
include per capita GDP (GDPpc) because, according to the Wagner Law, as a society 
becomes richer, there is an increasing demand for public expenditure. 
The basic model used to describe expenditure decision making process is the 
following: 
 
    DEVEXP t = α 1+α2GDPpct+  α3 CERt + α 4TEX t + α 5 ISI t + α 6POPt  +α 7VOT t + ετ   (1) 
 
where ετ is a random error. Some variables may be endogenous: for example, as argued 
before in the light of the interest groups theory, ISI affects DEVEXP, but higher government 
spending may increase the output of steel and iron, because of procurement and demand 
effects. For these reasons we address reverse causation applying the Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) technique by taking two lags of ISI as instruments. Figures 1 shows the behaviour 
over time of population and voters, figures 2 and 3 plot government spending and deviation of 
government spending from trend, respectively. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]  
Data for the dependent variable is taken from Federico (2008), it is constructed using 
data from Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1969) and expressed at 1911 prices. Most of the 
state budget consisted in payment of interests on public debt and military expenditure (mainly 
for personnel). The gross sellable output of cereals is provided by Federico. In a number of 
works he has reconstructed the statistical data for agriculture, showing that previous estimates 
from Istat (1957) overestimated grain production in the early 1870s and underestimated 
agricultural production from the 1880s until World War I. Federico (2000) reports the value 
added and gross sellable output data for benchmarks in 1891, 1911, 1938 and 1951, divided 
for the most important products.
9 In a subsequent paper (Federico, 2003) he gives the gross 
sellable output for the whole agricultural production from 1861 to 1913. Our data (which 
should be considered preliminary), directly provided by Giovanni Federico, gives the gross 
sellable output of cereals, which we take as a proxy for grain production. TEX, ISI and per 
capita GDP are taken from the new estimates of Italian industrial production given by 
Fenoaltea (2005). All production data are in 1911 prices.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Tests for nonstationarity  
Before estimating the structural equation, the analysis of the stochastic properties of 
the series is applied in order to establish whether public expenditure and all explanatory 
                                                 
9 The gross sellable output is the value of all products minus their reinvestment in the agricultural sector. The 
value added is obtained from the gross sellable output by subtracting the cost of expenditures from other sectors 
of the economy. For the years 1891 and 1911 the expenditure to gross sellable output ratio was equal to 4.3% 
and 7.09%, respectively. Clearly, the choice of putting together different measures of production adds some 
noise in the estimations. However, we believe that this is not sizable, and removing expenditure based on the 
benchmark years from all years would have added further noise, since we would have made assumptions on the 
distributions over time of expenditures that would not be soundly based.  variables used in the regression model share a long or a short run relationship. This 
information makes it possible to correctly specify the model by avoiding spurious regression 
problems. The stationarity has been verified by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF), 
and the autoregressive structure has been determined according the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC). The test specification includes a constant and a trend for all series. The 
results are presented in Table 1: nonstationarity can never be rejected.
10   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Regression results 
The assessment of the stochastic properties of the series allows us to express equation 
(1) by first differencing all the variables in order to prevent spurious regression. Therefore, 
the estimated regressions are short-term relations. From an econometric point of view the 
specification test cannot reject the validity of the instruments, and the variables are jointly 
different from zero at the usual significance levels. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The variable CER is not significantly different from zero. The class of grain cultivators 
mainly  represented elderly landowners. They were not interested in the capitalistic 
development of agriculture; rather they operated in order to keep their property rights and to 
crystallise social and productive relationships.
11 Therefore, it is reasonable to maintain that 
                                                 
10 The variable GDPpc is I(1) since the ADF test rejects the null of nonstationarity on the first-differenced series 
(the test statistics is -4.1192, with 1 lag according to the SIC).  
11 Most likely, the interest of the grain entrepreneurs in the infrastructures, such as ports for sea-transportation, 
would grow stronger during World War I. they controlled more on the receipts side of the budget, rather than on expenditure. Indeed, 
between 1885 and 1910 the estate tax decreased from 125 to 84 million liras (Castronovo, 
1975, p. 143). Nevertheless, the requests of the traditional landowners were focused on the 
tariff of wheat that scholars (Toniolo, 1978, among others) consider the pactum sceleris the 
protected industrial sectors accepted to buy their privileges.
12  
The coefficient of ISI is significantly positive. Empirical evidence suggests the idea, 
maintained by historians, that the state helped the iron and steel industry through procurement 
both in the military and in the railway sectors (in particular after nationalisation in 1905). In 
addition, government grants supported the naval industry. Despite the fact that such industry 
was founded with the direct support of the state, this result emphasises that it was a private 
business. It was able to put pressure on the government to guarantee a satisfying utilisation of 
the productive capacity, overcoming the small size of the national market. The establishment 
of the Società degli Altoforni, Acciaierie e Fonderie di Terni in 1884 is the most evident sign 
of the role of the interest groups in the political framework and of logrolling within the 
legislature (Bonelli, 1975: 15). The firm, while remaining a private company, was the result 
of both the private capital led by V. S. Breda, who also was elected to the Senate, and the 
state capital: the government advanced 12 million liras to the company buying some 
components of military navies. Furthermore, the interest group of metal-makers also benefited 
from monetary and credit policy: Terni’s iron mills avoided bankruptcy by receiving loans 
funded by the Bank of Italy (Bonelli, 1975; Cerioni, 2001). 
The variable TEX is insignificant. The different behaviour of the textile and steel 
entrepreneurs emerged already from the Inchiesta Industriale, a document framed during the 
                                                 
12 Maffeo Pantaleoni (1901) in a speech at the Chamber of Deputies highlighted that the tariff on wheat: 1) 
solely rewarded the landowners (about 50,000 units) and harmed both the sharecroppers and the tenants waiting 
for relocation; 2) guaranteed to the landowners a return (150 million liras) higher than costs represented by the 
estate tax (107 million liras).  last years of the government of the Left (1870-1874) and considered by the historians the 
most important source of information to reconstruct the origin of the protectionist choice 
realised in 1878 and 1887.
13 The Atti dell’Inchiesta Industriale emphasised that textile and 
steel entrepreneurs demanded aid from the state, especially in the form of protectionist 
measures. However, while the textile entrepreneurs did not put such a request in a strategy 
oriented to a qualitative reinforcement of their firms, the steel entrepreneurs asked for public 
investments also in education to obtain a skilled labour force. 
Population is positive and significantly different from zero. This result shows that an 
increase in population has the same effect on residual government expenditure. The variable 
for the extension of the franchise is insignificant, probably because the number of effective 
voters remained small. Indeed, during this period governments faced the so-called banditry 
(brigantaggio) in Southern Italy and the fasci siciliani, a separatist political movement in 
Sicily, which represented a way to express social discontent without going through the poorly 
representative institutional and political system. Finally, per capita GDP becomes significant 
when some insignificant variables are removed.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
  The trade tariffs imposed in 1878 and confirmed in 1887 are usually indicated as 
milestones of Italian policy in the 19
th century. It is reasonable to maintain that these political 
decisions were not the outcome of a careful and systematic attempt to set favourable 
conditions for the birth and the development of particular industries. However, historiography 
emphasises that these episodes were the result of positive answers to the requests of powerful 
interest groups. Such requests strengthened the alliance between political and entrepreneurial 
groups.  
                                                 
13 See on this point Baglioni (1974) and Marongiu (1995, 311-312).   Interest groups can seek several goals: protection from international competition and 
public expenditure programs, but also tax breaks and long-term contracts with government 
agencies. Starting from these considerations we have tested the influence that the groups 
protected in 1887 exerted on the expenditure decision-making process over 1876-1913. The 
main result points to the role of the iron and steel industries as the most powerful interest 
group.  
  This is in line with a traditional view dating back from the liberal school of the early 
20
th century. Luigi Einaudi (and in the same line the “L’Unità” edited by Gaetano Salvemini) 
in a number of articles attacked those he sarcastically called the ‘drillers’. Strictu sensu these 
were drilling in Northern Italy looking for oil, but in a more general way Einaudi referred to 
all entrepreneurs whose investment choices were distorted by government subsidies and 
tariffs. In particular, he showed the excessive production costs of the iron and steel industry 
and its behaviour as a trust were detrimental for the machine industry, the unreliability of the 
balance sheets of the companies, and quantified the total costs of the protection and subsidies 
of the iron and steel industry in 260 million liras in 1910.
14 In the view of the free-trade 
scholars the protectionist tariffs was a signal that policy makers were responsive to the 
requests of some interest groups (Cardini, 1981; Tedesco, 2002).  Furthermore, Pantaleoni, de 
Viti de Marco and Mazzola used the “Giornale degli Economisti” to emphasise the relevance 
of the “heavy” industry interests to the understanding of political behaviour. The Agriculture 
Minister Bruno Chimirri was one of the most criticised by Mazzola for his defence of vested 
interests. Cardini (1981: 109) reported a statement in which Mr Chimirri described the 
intimate linkage between government spending and industries: 
 
“There is nothing sadder for the economy than the smokestacks  of the 
                                                 
14 See, among others, Einaudi (1911a and 1911b; 1912), Einaudi and Riboni (1912). bankrupted factories in Savona, the heavy mallets of Terni for which we hear at 
every blow taxpayers groaning, the factories in Pozzuoli producing machines 
paid by Italians”. (Our translation)                               
                                    
 Probably none of these free-market economists could have said it better. 
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 TABLE 2 – 2SLS results 
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(0.023) 
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(0.855) 
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(0.092) 




-0.079      
(0.192) 
  
dTEX  -0.052      
(0.374) 
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0.087***   
(0.014) 
dPOP  0.891**       
(0.434) 
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(0.378) 
0.808**      
(0.297) 
0.889***      
(0.262) 





N  36 36 36 36 
Specification test  2.1230   2.1782     2.1605     2.2532    
Testing β = 0  10.868* 10.183* 9.792**  10.055** 
The specification test is distributed under the null of the validity of the instruments as a χ
2 with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus one. The test β = 0 is distributed as a χ
2 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables minus one. Heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors in parentheses. The operator d indicates first differences. ***, ** and * indicate 

























 Figure 1. Population and voters levels (1876-1913) 















































Figure 2. Real public expenditure 1876-1913 (million liras) 
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